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ARGUMENT 
COUNSEL WAS DEFFICIENT FOR FAILING TO PRESENT THE ENTRAPMENT 
DEFENSE TO THE JURY. 
In its response, the State argues that Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel 
argument is frivolous because Appellant was willing to meet in a drug-free zone, the 
defense had little chance of success, and that an entrapment defense was inconsistent with 
defendant's theory of the case. 
a. Defendant's Initial Willingness to Meet Sylvester Scott at L. C. Watson's 
House Does Not Render the Claim Frivolous. 
Under Utah's objective standard for entrapment, 
"Entrapment occurs when a peace officer or a person directed by or acting 
in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in 
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not 
otherwise ready to commit it." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (2004). "The focus is not on the propensities and 
predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct revealed in the 
particular case falls below standards . . . for the proper use of governmental power." State 
v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500 (Utah 1979); see also State v. Cripps, 692 P.2d 747, 749 
(Utah 1984); State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317-18 (Utah App.1987). "[Njothing can be 
more reprehensible than to induce the commission of crime for the purpose of 
apprehending and convicting the perpetrator." State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496, 500-01 
(Utah 1979). It is equally reprehensible to induce the commission of a crime in a certain 
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location for the purpose of subjecting the perpetrator to the maximum possible prison 
term. 
The State first argues that defendant's claim is "frivolous" because the Sinclair 
and L.C. Watson's house were both within drug-free zones. Appellee's Br. at 10. This 
response fails to address whether or not police conduct in this case falls below standards 
for proper use of governmental power, and focuses instead on Appellant's alleged 
predisposition to commit a crime. In support of its response, the State points out, 'The 
uncontroverted evidence shows that Watson's home and the Sinclair mini-mart were both 
within drug-free zones." Appellee's Br. at 10. The proximity of another location to a 
parking lot was not an element of the crime, so counsel had no incentive to dispute this 
evidence until Appellee argued that such evidence shows conclusively that the first 
meeting place was a drug-free zone. Even though the undisputed evidence showed that 
L.C. Watson's home was close to a business with parking spaces, this neither proves that 
the home was a drug-free zone, nor that Appellant was not entrapped. The only evidence 
supporting the conclusion that the original meeting place was a drug-free zone is based 
on testimony that the house was 543 feet from Lou's Machine Shop, and 866 feet from a 
flour mill. (r. 188; Appellee's Br. at 11). At no point was the question of whether or not 
L.C. Watson's house was a drug-free zone ever litigated or conclusively answered. 
First, Appellant does not accept that evidence as conclusive proof L.C. Watson's 
house was a drug-free zone. The evidence certainly does not indicate that the house is a 
drug-free zone today, as public parking lots are not drug-free zones under the current 
version of the code. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (April 30, 2007). Appellant does not 
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argue the revisions should apply retroactively, simply that the deletion of "public parking 
lots" clarifies that the section did not intend to cover all parking lots. 
Even prior to the statutory amendments, Appellant finds no support for the 
proposition that drug-free zones extend to 1000 feet around any parking space, including 
those at private businesses. The establishment of drug-free zones was intended to protect 
from the "extreme potential danger created when drug transactions occur on or near 
school ground or other public places frequented by children." State v. Powasnik, 918 
P.2d 146, 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Section 58-37-8 creates increased penalties for any 
narcotics violations in or within 1000 feet of specified places, including schools or 
universities, parks, stadiums, amusement parks, arcades, shopping malls, or any parking 
lot or structure attached thereto. Prior versions of the section included "a public parking 
lot or structure" even if not attached to the grounds of a school, stadium, mall, etc. The 
most recent version of the Code does not name public parking lots as drug-free zones. 
See Addendum, 2007 Utah Laws Ch. 374 (H.B. 231). 
It seems inconsistent with the legislative purpose of protecting children to consider 
any location within 1000 feet of any parking space, such as the parking spaces at Lou's 
Machine Shop, a drug-free zone. Jury Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 89 (evidence that L.C. 
Watson's house was 543 feet from Lou's, and 866 feet from a flour mill). If that were the 
case, any home would be a drug-free zone if there is a driveway in front, and any road 
would be drug-free because people parallel park on roads. Even though children are not 
permitted on the premises, adult bookstores or bars would be special drug-free zones if 
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those businesses have parking spaces out front. The State's interpretation of § 58-37-8 is 
not in line with the clear legislative purpose of protecting children. 
The 2007 version of the Utah Code no longer designates public parking lots as 
drug-free zones. This may be because a "public parking lot" refers to parking lots 
attached to schools, universities, stadiums, libraries, etc., which are expressly designated 
as drug-free zones, making the designation redundant. If all parking lots, including the 
one at Lou's Machine Shop, are "public parking lots," use of the word "public" would be 
superfluous. Additionally, the Utah Code expressly recognizes the existence of other, 
non-public parking lots. For example, a "quasi-public parking lot" is a "privately owned 
or maintained . . . parking lot held open for the use of the public." Utah Code Ann. §41-
6a-214. This court has suggested that in order to find a privately owned parking lot is 
"public," there must be evidence "from which the jury could infer the . . . parking lot was 
a public parking lot." State v. Salgado, 2006 UT App 523, 2006 WL 3826635, *1 
(unpublished). Instead, it is likely that when the legislature designated "public parking 
lots" drug-free zones, they intended to distinguish such areas from "private parking lots," 
"quasi-public parking lots," or "all parking lots." 
Though defense counsel did not dispute that L.C. Watson's house was within 1000 
feet of Lou's Machine Shop, the State presented no evidence by which judge or jury 
could conclude that the house was a drug-free zone. Only if the legislature intended all 
narcotics violations in the state committed in or within 1000 feet of any quasi-public or 
private parking lot or structure (in addition to all the other drug-free zones) be subject to 
enhanced penalties would L.C. Watson's home be considered part of a drug-free zone. 
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At best, the evidence at trial showed the parking spaces at Lou's Machine Shop or the 
flour mill may have been quasi-public, because there was no evidence that the spaces are 
"held open for the use of the public." 
Even if the home, by virtue of its proximity to Lou's Machine Shop, constitutes a 
drug-free zone, the fact that the first location chosen by the police informant was a drug-
free zone does not mean Appellant was not entrapped. If both locations were drug-free 
zones, police selection of either location created an equal risk that a person not 
predisposed to sell drugs in a drug-free zone would do so. The entrapment defense would 
have been just as strong had Appellant been arrested at L.C. Watson's house because 
police used their unfettered discretion to choose a drug-free zone as the meeting place. 
Because police action caused the meeting to take place in a drug-free zone, 
Appellant's counsel should have argued entrapment as a defense to the enhancement. 
b. There Was No Legitimate Reason for Counsel to Not Present an 
Entrapment Defense to the Jury, and This Defense Would Have Been 
Consistent with the Defense Theory of the Case. 
In its response, Appellee next argues that an entrapment by location claim would 
have undermined Appellant's defense theory. At trial Appellant argued that Sylvester 
Scott set him up by placing drugs and a cell phone in his car on the day he was arrested. 
This theory is not undermined by an argument that the police and their informant, by 
orchestrating the crime to take place in a public place, created a substantial risk that the 
crime would be committed by someone not otherwise ready to commit it. 
In this case presenting a location entrapment defense would not have been a 
confession that defendant committed the charged conduct. Location entrapment is not 
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like a total entrapment defense, where a defendant argues that he committed the charged 
conduct, but only because of police action. The defense to the enhancement concedes 
nothing, and focuses on whether the police action was such that someone not ready to 
commit the crime might be induced into committing it by the police conduct. 
Police organized the meeting between Appellant and Sylvester Scott through 
Scott. Appellant's defense at trial concerned what happened at the meeting, specifically 
how crack cocaine came to be in Appellant's possession. Appellant does not argue that 
counsel was defective by failing to argue that he was entrapped into selling drugs to 
Sylvester Scott. Appellant argues counsel should have presented a defense to the jury 
that police improperly exercised their discretion to insure the meeting took place in a 
location subject to the enhancement, and thus subject to the maximum possible penalty. 
In no way does this undermine trial strategy. If anything, the entrapment by location 
defense would have bolstered Appellant's claim that Scott set him up by emphasizing 
that defendant was only meeting Scott because Scott told him to. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counsel in this case made professional errors by not arguing a potentially 
successful entrapment defense. There exists a reasonable probability that if trial counsel 
had presented an entrapment defense, the outcome would have been different. 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATED: August 17, 2007 
Skordas^GastoiTSTTydex 
Gregory G. Skordas 
Rebecca C. Hyde 
Counsel for Martin E. Hernandez-Camacho 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 17 day of August, 2007,1 caused to be mailed via 
United States first-class mail, postage pre-paid, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief to: 
Ryan Tenney 
Attorney Generals Office 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 -» 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 " > ? / 
A / / / / 
Sffid&Mak&n & Hyde 
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ADDENDA 
2007 Utah Laws Ch. 374 (H.B. 231) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (2007) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-214 (2007) 
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2007 Utah Laws Ch. 374 (H.B. 231) 
1 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES PENALTY 
2 AMENDMENTS 
3 2007 GENERAL SESSION 
4 STATE OF UTAH 
5 Chief Sponsor: Wayne A. Harper 
6 Senate Sponsor: Michael G. Waddoups 
7 
8 LONG TITLE 
9 General Description: 
10 This bill modifies the Utah Controlled Substances Act regarding violations of 
11 controlled substance laws in the presence of children, and regarding committing 
12 offenses in specified locations, including modifying the scope of the area surrounding 
13 the locations and modifying the list of locations. 
14 Highlighted Provisions: 
15 This bill: 
16 . amends the current crime of committing drug offenses in the "immediate presence" 
17 of persons younger than 18 to remove the word "immediate"; 
18 . amends the increased penalty for committing drug offenses in specified locations to 
19 address areas within 1,000 feet of the locations; and 
20 . adds libraries to the list of areas. 
21 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
22 None 
23 Other Special Clauses: 
24 None 
25 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
26 AMENDS: 
27 58-37-8, as last amended by Chapters 8 and 30, Laws of Utah 2006 
28 
29 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
30 Section 1. Section 58-37-8 is amended to read: 
31 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
32 (1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
33 (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
34 intentionally: 
35 (i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
36 manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
37 (ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or 
38 arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
39 (iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
40 (iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
41 (A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any 
42 violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
43 (B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
44 Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with 
45 five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, 
46 supervisor, or any other position of management. 
47 (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
48 (i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or 
49 gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and 
50 upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
51 (ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree 
52 felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
53 (iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a 
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54 second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
55 (c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) 
56 may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier 
57 of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his 
58 person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, 
59 the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
60 consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person 
61 convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not 
62 concurrently. 
63 (d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree 
64 felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and 
65 which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
66 person is not eligible for probation. 
67 (2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
68 (a) It is unlawful: 
69 (i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance 
70 analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
71 directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as 
72 otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
73 (ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, 
74 tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to 
75 be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
76 any of those locations; or 
77 (iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
78 prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
79 (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
80 (i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
81 (ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 
82 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree 
83 felony; or 
84 (iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of 
85 the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A 
86 misdemeanor. 
87 (c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a 
88 conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
89 penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
90 (d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled 
91 substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of 
92 marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty 
93 of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a 
94 third degree felony. 
95 (e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior 
96 boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or 
97 any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater 
98 than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled 
99 substances as listed in: 
100 (i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
101 indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
102 (A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to 
103 run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
104 (B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
105 not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
106 (ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
107 indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
108 convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
109 (f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
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110 (i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
111 (ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
112 (iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
113 (g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not 
114 amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207 : 
115 (i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any 
116 measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
117 (ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, 
118 causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another. 
119 (h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in his body: 
120 (i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in 
121 Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a second 
122 degree felony; 
123 (ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 
124 58-37-4 (2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA) is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
125 (iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class 
126 A misdemeanor. 
127 (3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
128 (a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
129 (i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a 
130 license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the 
131 purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a 
132 manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized 
133 person; 
134 (ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
135 administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to 
136 be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
137 controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any 
138 controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
139 prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
140 (iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, 
141 or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the 
142 terms of this chapter; or 
143 (iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed 
144 to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or 
145 device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling 
146 so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
147 (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree 
148 felony. 
149 (4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
150 (a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this 
151 chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, 
152 Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
153 Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if 
154 the trier of fact finds the act is committed: 
155 (i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
156 those schools; 
157 (ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the 
158 grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
159 (iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds 
160 which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or 
161 institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
162 (iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
163 (v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
164 (vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501 ; 
165 (vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, 
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166 playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
167 [(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;] 
168 (viii) in or on the grounds of a library; 
169 (ix) within [1,000] any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
170 grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) [through (viii)], (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii); 
171 (x) in the [immediate] presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of 
172 where the act occurs; or 
173 (xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or 
174 distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any 
175 correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3. 
176 (b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony 
177 and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would 
178 otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. 
179 (ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is 
180 not eligible for probation. 
181 (c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been 
182 less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this 
183 Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that 
184 offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g). 
185 (d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi): 
186 (A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
187 provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of 
188 one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
189 (B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term 
190 not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
191 (ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with 
192 the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, 
193 requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a 
194 violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi). 
195 (e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
196 mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or 
197 was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the 
198 location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that 
199 the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
200 (5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
201 misdemeanor. 
202 (6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in 
203 lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
204 (b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, 
205 conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to 
206 prosecution in this state. 
207 (7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a 
208 person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled 
209 substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with 
210 knowledge of the character of the substance or substances. 
211 (8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his 
212 professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
213 controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or 
214 orderly under his direction and supervision. 
215 (9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
216 (a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
217 an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
218 registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
219 (b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
220 employment. 
221 (10) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian, 
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222 as defined in Subsection 58-37-2 (l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for bona fide 
223 traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion 
224 as defined in Subsection 58-37-2 (l)(w). 
225 (b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in 
226 Subsection 58-37-4 (2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used, 
227 possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in 
228 connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion. 
229 (c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative 
230 defense under this Subsection (10) as soon as practicable, but not later than ten days prior to 
231 trial. 
232 (ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense. 
233 (iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for good 
234 cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
235 (d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (10) by 
236 a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to the 
237 charges. 
238 (11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person 
239 or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
240 invalid provision or application. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
PART 3. DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
V § 76-2-303. Entrapment 
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense. Entrapment occurs when a peace officer 
or a person directed by or acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit 
an offense does not constitute entrapment. 
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the 
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening the injury to a person other than the 
person perpetrating the entrapment. 
(3) The defense provided by this section is available even though the actor denies commission of the conduct 
charged to constitute the offense. 
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a matter 
of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made at 
least ten days before trial except the court for good cause shown may permit a later filing. 
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but if the 
court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial. 
Any order by the court dismissing a case based on entrapment shall be appealable by the state. 
(6) In any hearing before a judge or juiy where the defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the defendant 
shall not be admitted except that in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past convictions for 
felonies and any testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony 
at trial. 
Current through 2007 General Legislative Session. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-214 
WESTS UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6A. TRAFFIC CODE 
PART 2. APPLICABILITY AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC LAWS 
W § 41-6a-214. Quasi-public roads and parking areas—Local ordinances 
(1) As used in this section, "quasi-public road or parking area" means a privately owned and maintained road or 
parking area that is generally held open for use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking. 
(2)(a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance provide that a quasi-public road or parking area within the 
municipality or county is subject to this chapter. 
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this section without: 
(i) a public hearing; and 
(ii) the agreement of a majority of the owners of the quasi-public road or parking area involved. 
(3) This section: 
(a) supercedes conflicting provisions under Section 4l-6a-2 IS: 
(b) does not require a peace officer to patrol or enforce any provisions of this chapter on any quasi-public road or 
parking area; or 
(c) does not affect the duty of a peace officer to enforce those provisions of this chapter applicable to private 
property other than under this section. 
Current through 2007 General Legislative Session. 
Copr © 2007 Thomson/West 
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